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The World Bank’s two-stage project on “Poverty Alleviation Through Reducing 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives” begins with five premises: 
•  Three-quarters of the world’s poor (<$1/day) live in developing countries and 
depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood; 
•  Poverty can be alleviated by economic growth (Dollar and Kray 2002, 2004); 
•  In addition to the comparative static welfare costs of price and trade policy 
interventions by governments (Bhagwati 1971, Corden 1997), economic growth 
also is inhibited by them (Easterly 2001; Winters 2002, 2004) 
o  and those interventions are becoming ever-more costly in the case of 
agriculture when they blunt producers’ responsiveness to consumers’ 
strengthening preferences for quality, variety and safety attributes of food 
(Reardon and Timmer 2007); 
•  In many developing countries their government policies have depressed farm 
incomes, while in many high-income (and some developing) countries 
government policies have raised those countries’ prices and outputs of farm 
products and thereby depressed the cash earnings of farm households in other 
developing countries; and 
•  The ostensible national objectives of those government interventions in both 
developing and high-income countries, including poverty alleviation, could be 
achieved more efficiently and effectively with other policy instruments than (or 
even just without) the ones chosen. 
One of the reasons for the present research project is to see to what extent these 
last two premises still hold. Reasons to re-evaluate them include significant unilateral 
agricultural, trade and exchange rate policy reforms in numerous low-, middle- and high-
income countries over the past two decades (Valdes 1998; Jensen, Robinson and Tarp 
2002; Akiyama et al. 2003), including the de-coupling of some farm-support programs   3
from production and the provision by some high-income countries of preferential market 
access for selected low-income country exporters. For the countries where those premises 
are no longer true, when were the turning points, what form did they take, and how close 
are those countries now to free trade? For the countries where the above premises still 
hold, what is the nature and extent of the remaining distortions, and what could be gained 
in terms of raising the level and growth of national economic welfare and reducing 
poverty and inequality by liberalizing either developing or high-income countries’ 
policies? For any particular developing country, what would be the relative contribution 
of own-reform, reform by other developing countries, and reform by high-income 
countries; and how important are the potential direct contributions from agricultural 
policy reform relative to the indirect contributions from non-agricultural policy reforms?
1 
How much of the benefit or cost of ‘agricultural and food’ policies (which are negotiated 
in the WTO and hence analyzed by trade economists as a package) accrues to farmers as 
distinct from food processors? What explains the pattern of distortions to farmers and 
food consumers across countries and over time, both within the agricultural sector and 
between it and other sectors, and the range of choices of (often sub-optimal) policy 
instruments for achieving each nation’s objectives? 
These types of questions cannot be answered without accurate estimates of the 
changing extent of distortions to incentives over an extensive time period in a broad 
sample of countries at various stages of development. The first part of this project is 
aimed at providing such a time series of estimates for a large sample of countries, and 
then using it as the basis for an analytical narrative of the history and reasons behind the 
evolution of distortions in that economy (bearing in mind that getting markets right 
requires a focus not only on incentives but also on institutions and infrastructure). The 
empirical estimates will build on the pioneering work to the mid-1980s by Krueger, 
                                                 
1 These questions have been addressed recently by global CGE modelers (e.g., Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2007) using the GTAP-AGR model for 2001, and Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) 
using the Linkage model projected to 2015. Both models suggest that agricultural value added (i.e. net farm 
incomes) would rise in developing countries if high-income countries were to remove their agricultural 
protection (despite preference erosion), and that while they would fall a bit from farm policy reform in 
developing countries, that would be more than offset if all countries were to liberalize all merchandise 
trade, except in some South Asian and European transition economies. Those results are derived using the 
GTAP protection database though, which relies mostly on just tariff rates to estimate developing country 
distortions and so may be misleading. Those studies will be redone once a more-comprehensive distortions 
database becomes available via the present project.   4
Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1991) and updates by Valdes (1996, 2000), the work by 
Anderson, Hayami and Others (1986) for Korea, Taiwan and high-income countries and, 
for the period since 1986, by the OECD (2007a) for its member countries and select non-
member, although the methodology will differ a little from each of those approaches.
2  
The most commonly used distortions for global trade policy modeling are those in 
the GTAP database (see Valenzuela and Anderson 2006, Table 2), but that set does not 
include non-tariff barriers to imports and exports (nor all export taxes or consumption 
taxes/subsidies). A recent study of the overall trade restrictiveness index (developed by 
Anderson 1998 and Anderson and Neary 2006), albeit using rather crude indicators of 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), suggests the latter are as important as tariff barriers (see 
Valenzuela and Anderson 2006, Tables 3 and 4), so relying on just tariffs may miss many 
of the distortions in agricultural and food markets.
3 On the other hand, tariffs are 
redundant in some industries, and so may overstate protection provided to producers in 
those industries.   
This paper outlines the methodological issues associated with the task of 
measuring that actual delivered direct protection or taxation to individual agricultural 
industries, as well as the direct protection or anti-protection to non-agricultural sectors 
(which can have an offsetting effect via Lerner’s Symmetry Theorem). It begins with a 
guide to what elements in principle could be measured. It then discusses the more-limited 
scope of what measurements in practice we are aiming to include in this study.  
Not all aspects of the following will be relevant to every country in the study, as 
our project includes the full spectrum of countries from richest to poorest, from land-
abundant per capita to land- and water-scarce, and from landlocked and small-island 
economies to the massive countries of China, India and Russia. (Together the included 
developing, transition and high-income countries account for around 90 percent of global 
                                                 
2 Less-careful but longer historical time series of agricultural protection rates can be found in Lindert 
(1991). Rough cross-country estimates for the early 1980s for ex ante Uruguay Round modeling of 
distortions to global food markets are available in Tyers and Anderson (1992), as summarized in Figure 1. 
3 Some of the NTBs are in place to (perhaps inefficiently) overcome externalities associated with natural 
resource depletion (a ban on log exports) or disease importation (SPS or quarantine restrictions). This is but 
one example of where care is needed to distinguish between distortions and other market intervention 
measures. Even where the motivation for, say, an import ban might be for plant health reasons, it is possible 
that the ban is so costly to consumers relative to the plant-health benefit it provides import-competing 
producers that national welfare could be improved by abolishing the SPS measure (James and Anderson 
1998).    5
GDP, population, trade and agricultural employment and exports – see Sandri, 
Valenzuela and Anderson 2006). 
 
What theory suggests should be measured 
 
Two key purposes of the distortion estimates being generated by this project are: 
•  To provide a long annual time series of indicators showing the extent to which 
price incentives faced by farmers and food consumers have been distorted directly 
and indirectly by own-government policies in all major developing, transition and 
high-income countries, and hence for the world as a whole (taking international 
prices as given); and 
•  To attribute the price distortion estimates for each farm product to specific border 
or domestic policy measures, so they can serve as inputs into various types of 
partial and general equilibrium economic models for estimating the effects of 
those various policies on such things as national and international agricultural 
markets, farm value added, income inequality, poverty, and national, regional and 
global welfare. 
The first objective, of getting a long time series for a wide range of countries at different 
stages of development and hence with different complexities and qualities of data, 
requires that the indicators be simple. That would also make it easier to update them 
subsequently for policy monitoring purposes. The third purpose, of making them useful 
for modelers seeking to distinguish market and household welfare effects, requires 
distortion estimates to be provided also for at least lightly processed foods.
4  
In this project, we follow the Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) concept of a 
market policy distortion as something that governments impose to create a gap between 
the marginal social return to a seller and the marginal social cost to a buyer in a 
transaction. Such a distortion creates an economic cost to society which can be estimated 
using welfare measures techniques such as those pioneered by Harberger (1971). As 
                                                 
4 Although it is not an explicit objective of the project, providing comparable estimates of distortions to 
lightly processed food industries in addition to primary agricultural industries at the farm gate and to food 
consumers at the retail level could illuminate trade and processing costs which contribute to price gaps at 
different points in the value chain.   6
Harberger notes, this focus allows a great simplification in evaluating the marginal costs 
of a set of distortions: changes in economic costs can be evaluated taking into account the 
changes in volumes directly affected by such distortions, ignoring all other changes in 
prices. In the absence of divergences such as externalities, the measure of a distortion is 
the gap between the price paid and the price received, irrespective of whether the level of 
these prices is affected by the distortion. 
Other developments that change incentives facing producers and consumers can 
include flow-on consequences of the distortion, but these should not be confused with the 
direct price distortion that we aim to estimate. If, for instance, a country is large in world 
trade for a given commodity, imposition of an export tax may raise the price in 
international markets, reducing the adverse impact of the distortion on producers in the 
taxing country. Another flow-on consequence is the effect of trade distortions on the real 
exchange rate, which is the price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods. Neither of 
these flow-on effects are of immediate concern, however, because if the direct distortions 
are accurately estimated, they can be incorporated as price wedges into an appropriate 
country or global economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which in 
turn will be able to capture the full general equilibrium impacts (inclusive of real 
exchange rate effects) of the various direct distortions to producer and consumer prices. 
Importantly, the total effect of distortions on the agricultural sector will depend 
not just on the size of the direct agricultural policy measures, but also on the magnitude 
of distortions generated by direct policy measures altering incentives in non-agricultural 
sectors. It is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producers’ incentives. In a two-sector model an import tax has the same effect on the 
export sector as an export tax: the Lerner (1936) Symmetry Theorem. This carries over to 
a model that has many sectors, and is unaffected if there is imperfect competition 
domestically or internationally or if some of those sectors produce only non-tradables 
(Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). The symmetry theorem is therefore also relevant for 
considering distortions within the agricultural sector. In particular, if import-competing 
farm industries are protected, for example via import tariffs, this has similar effects on 
incentives to produce exportables as does an explicit tax on agricultural exports; and if 
both measures are in place, this is a double imposition on farm exporters.   7
In what follows, we begin by focusing first on direct distortions to agricultural 
incentives, before turning to those affecting the sector indirectly via non-agricultural 
policies.  
 
Direct agricultural distortions 
Consider a small, open, perfectly competitive national economy with many firms 
producing a homogeneous farm product with just primary factors. In the absence of 
externalities, processing, producer-to-consumer wholesale plus retail marketing margins, 
exchange rate distortions, and domestic and international trading costs, that country 
would maximize national economic welfare by allowing both the domestic farm product 
price and the consumer price of that product to equal E  times   , where  P E  is the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange and   is the foreign currency price of this 
identical product in the international market. That is, any government-imposed diversion 
from that equality, in the absence of any market failures or externalities, would be 
welfare-reducing for that small economy. 
P
 
Price-distorting trade measures at the national border 
The most common distortion is an ad valorem tax on competing imports (usually 
called a tariff),  . Such a tariff on imports is the equivalent of a production subsidy and a 
consumption tax both at rate  . If that tariff on the imported primary agricultural product 
is the only distortion, its effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal 
rate of assistance to farm output conferred by border price support (NRABS), which is the 
unit value of production at the distorted price less its value at the undistorted free market 
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5 The NRA thus differs from the producer support estimate (PSE) as calculated by the OECD, in that the 
PSE is expressed as a fraction of the distorted value. It is thus  ) 1 /( m m t t +  and so for a positive   it is 
smaller than the NRA and is necessarily less than 100 percent. 
m t  8
The effect of that import tariff on consumer incentives in this simple economy is 
to generates a consumer tax equivalent (CTE) on the agricultural product for final 
consumers: 
m t CTE = ) 2 ( 
The effects of an import subsidy are identical to those in equations (1) and (2) for 
an import tax, but   in that case would have a negative value.   m t
 
Governments sometimes also intervene with an export subsidy   (or an export 
tax in which case   would be negative). If that were the only intervention: 
x s
x s
x BS s CTE NRA = = ) 3 (  
 
If any of these trade taxes or subsidies were specific rather than ad valorem (e.g., 
$y/kg rather than z percent), its ad valorem equivalent can be calculated using slight 
modifications of equations (1), (2) and (3). 
 
Domestic producer and consumer price-distorting measures 
Governments sometimes intervene with a direct production subsidy for farmers, 
 (or production tax, in which case   is negative, including via informal taxes in kind 
by local and provincial governments). In that case, if only this distortion is present, the 
effect on producer incentives can be measured as the nominal rate of assistance to farm 
output conferred by domestic price support (NRADS), which is as above except   
replaces   or  , but the CTE in that case is zero. Similarly, if the government just 
imposes a consumption tax   on this product (or consumption subsidy, in which case   
is negative), the CTE is as above except   replaces   or  , but the  in that case 
is zero.  
f s f s
f s
m t x s
c c c c
c c m t x s DS NRA
The combination of domestic and border price support provides the total rate of 
assistance to output,    . o NRA
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What if the exchange rate system also is distorting prices? 
Should a multi-tier foreign exchange rate regime be in place, then another policy-induced 
price wedge exists. A simple two-tier exchange rate system creates a gap between the 
price received by all exporters and the price paid by all importers for foreign currency, 
changing both the exchange rate received by exporters and that paid by importers from 
the equilibrium rate E  that would prevail without this distortion in the domestic market 
for foreign currency (Bhagwati 1978).   
Exchange rate overvaluation of the type we consider here requires controls by the 
government on current account transfers. A common requirement is that exporters 
surrender their foreign currency earnings to the central bank for exchange to local 
currency at a low official rate. This is equivalent to a tax on exports to the extent that 
official rate is below what the exchange rate would be in a market without government 
intervention. That implicit tax on exporters reduces their incentive to export and hence 
the supply of foreign currency flowing into the country. With less foreign currency, 
demanders are willing to bid up its purchase price. That provides a potential rent for the 
government, which can be realized by auctioning off the limited supply of foreign 
currency extracted from exporters or creating a legal secondary market. Either 
mechanism will create a gap between the official and parallel rates. 
Such a dual exchange rate system is depicted in Figure 1, in which is it assumed 
that the overall domestic price level is fixed, perhaps by holding the money supply 
constant (Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 1981). The supply of foreign exchange is given 
by the upward sloping schedule,  , and demand by  , where the official exchange 
rate facing exporters is   and the secondary market rate facing importers is  . At the 
low rate  , only   units of foreign currency are available domestically, instead of the 
equilibrium volume   that would result if exporters were able to exchange at the 
“equilibrium rate” 
fx S fx D
0 E m E
0 E S Q
E Q
E  units of local currency per unit of foreign currency.
6 The gap 
                                                 
6 “Equilibrium” in the sense of what would prevail without this distortion in the domestic market for 
foreign currency. In the diagram, and in the discussion that follows, the equilibrium exchange rate E  
exactly balances the supply and demand for foreign currency. Taken literally, this implies a zero balance on 
the current account. The approach here can readily be generalized to accommodate exogenous capital flows   10
between the official and the secondary market exchange rates is an indication of the 
magnitude of the tax imposed on trade by the two-tier exchange rate: relative to the 
equilibrium rate E , the price of importables is raised by  E em × , which is equal to 
, while the price of exportables is reduced by  ) ( E Em − E ex × , which is equal to 
, where   and   are the fractions by which the two-tier exchange rate system 
raises the domestic price of the importable and lowers the domestic price of the 
exportable, respectively. The estimated division of the total foreign exchange distortion 
between an implicit export tax,  , and an implicit import tax,  , will depend on the 
estimated elasticities of supply of exports and of demand for imports.
) ( 0 E E − m e x e
x e m e
7 If the demand and 
supply curves in Figure 1 had the same slope, then   =   and  m e x e ) ( x m e e +  is the 
secondary market premium or proportional rent extracted by the government or its 
agents.
8 
If the government chooses to allocate the limited foreign currency to different 
groups of importers at different rates, that is called a multiple exchange rate system. 
Some lucky importers may even be able to purchase it at the low official rate. The more 
that is allocated and sold to demanders whose marginal valuation is below  , the  m E
                                                                                                                                                   
E
fx D fx S
and transfers, which would shift the location of Q . With constant-elasticity supply and demand curves all 
of the results would carry through, and any exogenous change in those capital flows or transfers would 
imply a shift in the   or   curves. 
7 From the viewpoint of wanting to use the   and   estimates later as parameters in a CGE 
model, it does not matter what assumptions are made here about these elasticities, as the CGE model’s 
results for real variables will not be affected. What matters for real impacts is the magnitude of the total 
distortion, not its allocation between an export tax and an import tax: the traditional incidence result from 
tax theory that also applies to trade taxes (Lerner 1936). For an excellent general equilibrium treatment, 
using an early version of the World Bank’s 1-2-3 Model, see de Melo and Robinson (1989). There the 
distinction is made between traded and non-traded goods (using the Armington (1969) assumption of 
differentiation between products sold on domestic as distinct from international markets), in contrast to the 
distinction between tradable and non-tradable products made below. 
o NRA CTE
8 Note that this same type of adjustment could be made where the government forces exporters to surrender 
all foreign currency earnings to the domestic commercial banking system and importers to buy all foreign 
currency needs from that banking system where that system is allowed by regulation to charge excessive 
fees. This apparently occurs in, for example, Brazil, where the spread is reputedly 12 percent. If actual costs 
in a non-distorted competitive system are only 2 percent (as they are in the less-distorted Chilean 
economy), the difference of 10 points could be treated as the equivalent of a 5 percent export tax and a 5 
percent import tax applying to all tradables (but, as with non tariff barriers, there would be no government 
tariff revenue but rather rent, in this case accruing to commercial banks rather than to the central bank). 
This is an illustration of the point made by Rajan and Zingales (2004) of the power of financial market 
reform in expanding opportunities.    11
greater the unsatisfied excess demand at   and hence the stronger the incentive for an 
illegal or ‘black’ market to form, and for less-unscrupulous exporters to lobby the 
government to legalize the secondary market for foreign exchange and to allow exporters 
to retain some fraction of their exchange rate earnings for sale in the secondary market. 
Providing such a right to exporters to retain and sell a portion of foreign exchange 
receipts increases their incentives to export, and thereby reduces the shortage of foreign 
exchange and hence the secondary market exchange rate (Tarr 1990). In terms of Figure 
1, the available supply increases from   to  , bringing down the secondary rate from 
 to   such that the weighted average of the official rate and   received by 











x E r  and  ) 1 ( r − ). Again, if the demand 
and supply curves in Figure 1 had the same slope, then the implicit export and import 
taxes resulting from this regime would be each equal to half the secondary market 
premium. 
In the absence of a secondary market and with multiple rates for importers below 
 and for exporters below  , a black market often emerges. Its rate for buyers will be 
above 
m E 0 E
E  by more the more the government sells its foreign currency to demanders whose 
marginal valuation is below   and the more active is the government in catching and 
punishing exporters selling in that illegal market. If the black market was allowed to 
operate ‘frictionlessly’ there would be no foreign currency sales to the government at the 
official rate and the black market rate would fall to the equilibrium rate 
m E
E . So even 
though in the latter case the observed premium would be positive (equal to the proportion 
by which E  is above nominal official rate  ), there would be no distortion. For present 
purposes, since the black market is not likely to be completely ‘frictionless’, it can be 
thought of as similar to the system involving a retention scheme. In terms of Figure 1, 
'
m E  would be the black market rate for a proportion of sales and the weighted average of 
that and  0 E  would be the exporters’ return. Calculating 
'
x E  in this case (and hence being 
able to estimate the implicit export and import taxes associated with this regime) by using
the same approach as in the case with no illegal market thus requires not only knowing 
0 E
   12
0 E  and the black market premium but also guessing the proportion, r , of sales in that 
black market. 
In short, where a country has distortions in its domestic market for foreign 
currency, the exchange rate relevant for calculating the   or   for a particular 
tradable product depends, in the case of a dual exchange rate system, on whether the 
product is an importable or an exportable, while in the case of multiple exchange rates it 
depends on the specific rate applying to that product each year. 
o NRA CTE
 
What about real exchange rate changes? 
A change in the real exchange rate alters equally the prices of exportables and 
importables relative to the prices of nontradable goods and services. Such a change can 
arise for many different reasons, including changes in the availability of capital inflows, 
macroeconomic policy adjustments, or changes in the international terms of trade. When 
the economy receives a windfall – such as a greater inflow of foreign exchange from 
remittances or foreign aid or a commodity boom – the community moves to a higher 
indifference curve (Collier and Gunning 1998). While net imports of tradables can 
change in response to this inflow of foreign exchange, the domestic supply of and 
demand for nontradables must balance. The equilibrating mechanism is the price of 
nontradables. The price of nontradables rises to bring forth the needed increase in the 
supply of nontradables, and to reduce the demand for these products to bring it into line 
with supply (Salter 1959).  
While this type of change in the real exchange rate affects the incentive to 
produce tradables, it is quite different from distortions in the market for foreign currency 
analyzed above, in two respects. First, this real exchange rate appreciation reduces the 
incentives to produce importables and exportables to the same degree. In contrast with 
the multiple-tier exchange rate case, that appreciation does not generate any change in the 
prices of exportables relative to importables. Second, most such changes do not involve 
direct economic distortions of the type measurable using tools such as producer or 
consumer surplus. If the government, or the private sector, chooses to borrow more from 
abroad to increase domestic spending, this may raise the real exchange rate, but such an 
outcome is not obviously a distortion. Moreover, symmetric treatment of any such   13
“overvaluation” during periods of high foreign borrowing would require taking into 
account exchange rate “undervaluation” during periods of low foreign borrowing or 
repayment of foreign debt. For these reasons, we do not follow Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes (1988) and Orden et al. (2007) in including deviations of real exchange rates from 
benchmark values, unless these deviations arise from direct exchange rate distortions 
such as multiple-tier exchange rates.
9 
 
What if trade costs are sufficiently high for the product to be not traded internationally? 
Suppose the transport costs of trading are sufficient to make it unprofitable for a product 
to be traded internationally, such that the domestic price fluctuates over time within the 
band created by the cif import price and the fob export price. Then any trade policy 
measure (  or  ) or the product-specific exchange rate distortion (e.g.,   or  ) is 
redundant. In that case, in the absence of other distortions, 
m t x s m e x e
0 = o NRA , and the  0 = CTE . 
However, in the presence of any domestic producer or consumer tax or subsidy (  or  ) 
the domestic prices faced by both producers and consumers will be affected. The extent 
of the impact depends on the price elasticities of domestic demand and supply for the 
non-tradable (the standard closed-economy tax incidence issue).  
f s c t
To give a specific example, suppose just a production tax is imposed on farmers 
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9 Results from a multi-country research project that has had macro policy as its focus are reported in Little 
et al. (1993).   14




What if farm production involves not just primary factors but also intermediate inputs? 
Where intermediate inputs are used in farm production, any taxes or subsidies on their 
production, consumption or trade would alter farm value added and thereby also affect 
farmer incentives. Sometimes a government will have directly offsetting measures in 
place, such as a domestic subsidy for fertilizer use by farmers but also a tariff on fertilizer 
imports. In other situations there will be farm input subsidies but an export tax on the 
final product.
11 In principle all these items could be brought together to calculate an 
effective rate of direct assistance to farm value added (ERA). The nominal rate of direct 
assistance to farm output, NRAo, is a component of that, as is the sum of the nominal rates 
of direct assistance to all farm inputs, call it NRAi. In principle, all three rates can be 
positive or negative.  
Participants were not required to estimate ERAs in this project because to do so 
requires knowing each product’s value added share of output. Such data are not available 
for most developing countries even every few years, let alone for every year in the time 
series. And in most developing countries distortions to farm inputs are very small 
compared with distortions to farm output prices and those purchased inputs are a small 
fraction of the value of output. But where there are significant distortions to input costs, 
their ad valorem equivalent is accounted for by summing each input’s NRA times its 
input-output coefficient to obtain the combined NRAi, and adding that to the farm 
industry’s nominal rate of direct assistance to farm output, NRAo, to get the total nominal 
rate of assistance to farm production, call it simply NRA.
 12 
 
                                                 
10 As in the two-tier exchange rate case, the elasticities are used merely to identify the incidence of these 
measures: as long as both the NRAo and the CTE are included in any economic model used to assess the 
impact of the production tax, the real impacts will depend only on the magnitude of the total distortion, sf , 
not on the estimated NRA and CTE. 
11 On this general phenomenon of offsetting distortions for outputs and inputs (and even direct payments or 
taxes), see Rausser (1982). 
12 Bear in mind that a fertilizer plant or livestock feedmix plant might be enjoying import tariff protection 
that raises the domestic price of fertilizer or feedmix to farmers by more than any consumption subsidy (as 
had been the case for fertilizer in Korea – Anderson 1983), in which case the net contribution of this set of 
input distortions to the total NRA for agriculture would be negative.   15
i o NRA NRA NRA + = ) 7 (.   
 
What about post-farmgate costs?  
If a state trading corporation is charging excessively for its marketing services and 
thereby lowering the farm-gate price of a product, for example as a way of raising 
government revenue in place of an explicit tax, the extent of that excess should be treated 
as if it is a tax. 
Some farm products, including some that are not internationally traded, are inputs 
into a processing industry that may also be subject to government interventions. In that 
case the effect of those interventions on the price received by farmers for the primary 
product also needs to be taken into account. Before explaining how, it is helpful first to 
review the role that the value chain’s marketing and distribution margins can play in the 
calculation of distortions to primary agricultural activities, so as to ensure non-
distortionary price wedges are not inadvertently included in any distortions calculation. 
 
Non-distortionary price wedges 
So far it has been assumed there are no divergences between farmer, 
processor/wholesaler, consumer and border prices other than because of subsidies or 
taxes on production, consumption, trade or foreign currency. In practice this is not so, and 
these costly value chain activities need to be explicitly recognized and netted out when 
using comparisons of domestic and border prices to derive estimates of government 
policy induced distortions.
13 Such recognition also offers the opportunity to compare the 
’s size with wedges associated with such things as trade and processing costs (used 
in trade facilitation and value chain analyses, respectively). It may also expose short-term 
situations where profits of importers or exporters are amplified by less-than-complete 
adjustment by agents in the domestic value chain. 
NRA
                                                 
13 That is not to say there is no interest in comparisons across countries or over time in, say, the farm-gate 
price as a proportion of the fob export price, which summarizes the extent to which the producer price is 
depressed by the sum of internal transport, processing and marketing costs plus such things as explicit or 
implicit production or export taxes. Prominent users of that proportion – which can be less than half in low-
income countries even where there is little or no processing – include Bates (1981) and Binswanger and 
Scandizzo (1983). Users need to be aware, though, that this ratio understates the extent of farmer assistance 
(that is, it understates the rate of protection or overstates the rate of dis-protection to farmers), possibly by a 
large margin.   16
 
Domestic trading costs 
Trading costs can be non-trivial both intra- and inter-nationally, especially in developing 
countries with poorly developed infrastructure.
14 For example, domestic trading costs are 
involved in getting farm products to the port or to the domestic wholesaler (assuming the 
latter are at the international border, otherwise another set of domestic transport costs 
need to be added to obtain a relevant price comparison). Suppose domestic transport costs 
are equal to the fraction   of the price received by the farmer.   f T
 
Processor/wholesaler costs 
Domestic processing costs and wholesale and retail distribution margins can represent a 
large share of the final retail price. Indeed Reardon and Timmer (2007) argue that they 
are becoming an increasingly important part of the value chain in developing countries as 
consumers desire ever-more post-farm processing and services added to their farm 
products, aided by the supermarket revolution’s contribution to globalization.
15 We 
denote the increases in the consumer price due to the processing and wholesaling 
activities as   and  , respectively, over and above the farm-gate price plus domestic 
trade cost (or just   above the price of the imported processed product, if the processing 
p m u m
u m
                                                 
14 On the basic economics of trading costs as affected by such things as infrastructure within the country, at 
the border (ports, airports) and, in the case of landlocked countries, in transit countries, as well as 
international freight etc. costs, and their impact on both the aggregate volume and product structure of 
international trade, see Limao and Venables (2001), Venables and Limao (2002), and Venables (2004). See 
also the survey by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), where it is reported that the tax equivalent of trading 
costs are estimated to be more than 170 percent in high-income countries and higher in developing and 
transition economies, especially those that are small, poor and remote. Trade facilitation, through lowering 
those trading costs (e.g., streamlining customs clearance procedures), can be the result not only of 
technological changes but also of government policy choices such as restrictions on which ships can be 
used in bilateral trade. For example, Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2004) estimate that the policy contribution to 
costs of shipping goods from developing countries to the US is greater than the border import barriers. 
More generally on imperfect competition in services markets including cartelized international shipping, 
see Francois and Wooten (2001, 2006).  
15 The costs of processing and of wholesale/retail distribution, as well as domestic trading costs, change 
over time not only because of technological advances but also following policy changes. For example, 
government investment in rural infrastructure can lower trading costs. Reardon and Timmer (2006) argue 
that the global supermarket revolution is in part driven by the opening of domestic markets following the 
relaxation of government restrictions on foreign direct investment since the 1980s. These types of 
government policies are not included in the present project’s measurement of distortions.    17
has to be done prior to the product being internationally tradable) in the absence of 
market imperfections or government distortions along the value chain. 
 
International trading costs 
International trading costs are not an issue in the distortions calculations if the 
international price used is the cif import unit value for an importable or the fob export 
unit value for an exportable. But they are relevant if there is no trade (because of, say, a 
prohibitive trade tax on the product) or those border prices are unrepresentative (because 
of low trade volumes, e.g.). In those instances, it is recommended to select an 
international indicator price series (such as from the World Bank or IMF) and to account 
for international trading costs (ocean or air freight, insurance, etc.).
16 We denote  as the 
proportion by which the domestic price of the import-competing product is raised above 
what it otherwise would be at the country’s border, or equivalently that the price abroad 




Product quality/variety differences 
The quality of a product traded internationally is usually considered to be different from 
that of the domestically sold substitute, with consumers typically having a home-country 
bias.
17 When appropriate the domestic price should be deflated (inflated) by the extent to 
which the good imported is deemed by domestic consumers to be inferior (superior) in 
                                                 
16 Trading costs may be unrelated to the product price (i.e., specific rather than ad valorem), in which case 
the formulae should be adjusted accordingly (e.g., if Tf is in dollars per ton). If this were the case with 
international trading costs, the domestic price of importables (exportables) would change less (more) than 
proportionately with P. The ad valorem assumption is preferable to the specific one in situations where 
international price and exchange rate changes are less than fully passed though the domestic value chain to 
the farmer and consumer because of incomplete market integration caused, for example, by poor 
infrastructure or weak institutions. Ideally in such cases one would estimate econometrically the extent to 
which the price transmission elasticity is below unity and use it to calculate the margin each year. 
  Trading costs include storage costs that would be incurred to hold domestic products until the 
same time in the season when international trade takes place. Any subsidies or taxes on these or any other 
trading costs should be included in the distortion calculus. On the importance of these domestic trading 
costs in low-income countries, see the following case studies of Madagascar (Moser, Barrett and Minten 
2005) Rwanda (Diop, Brenton and Asarkaya 2005) and Bangladesh (Balkht, Koolwal and Khandker 2006).  
17 On how and why the quality and variety of traded goods vary by country of origin, see Hummels and 
Klenow (2005).   18
quality to the domestic product.
18 We denote   as the deflating fraction to adjust for 
product quality/variety differences in the case of importables. 
m q
Similarly for exported goods, and especially if an international indicator price has to be 
used in lieu of the fob export unit value (e.g., when exports are close to zero and 
unrepresentative), the international price needs to be deflated (inflated) by the extent to 
which the good is deemed by foreign consumers to be inferior (superior) in quality 
relative to the indicator good. We denote   as the deflating fraction to adjust for product 
quality/variety differences in the case of exportables. 
x q
 
Net effect of non-distortionary influences 
With all these influences, and so long as the product is still traded internationally, the 
relationships between the domestic farmers’ price and the international price in the 
absence of government-imposed price and trade policies become the following for an 
importable:  
m
m p f f
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and for an exportable it is: 
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while the urban consumer price is above the producer price to the following extent: 
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where   is the farmgate price.   f P
 
Impact of distortions to food processing on agricultural NRAs 
Some farm products that are not internationally traded in their primary form (e.g., raw 
milk, cane sugar) are tradable once lightly processed, and the downstream processing 
                                                 
18 We assume that the quality difference arises because one good provides more effective units of services 
than another, so that the relative price is a constant proportion of the value of the first good. When products 
are simply differentiated, without such a quality dimension (as in Armington 1969), there will be no fixed 
relationship between the two prices.   19
industry may also be subject to government interventions. In that case the effect of the 
latter interventions on the price received by farmers for the primary product also needs to 
be taken into account, and that primary product should be classified as tradable.  
In the past some analysts have assumed any protection to processors if fully 
passed back to primary agriculture (as may be the case with a farmer-owned cooperative 
processing plant, for example). That effectively raises the farmers’ price by the rise in the 
processors’ price divided by the proportional contribution of the primary product to the 
value of the processed product. Another equally extreme but opposite assumption is zero 
pass-through by the processor back down the value chain to the farmer. That is likely to 
be the case if the raw material can be sourced internationally, but seems unlikely if the 
primary product is non-tradable and there is a positive price elasticity of farm supply 
(since an assisted processor would want to expand). A more neutral assumption is 
proportional pass-through by the processor down the value chain to farmers and their 
transporters and/or up the value chain to consumers. That is equivalent to an equal 
sharing of the benefits along the value chain, which is more likely to be the case the more 
equally market power is spread among the players in that chain.  
This trio of examples illustrates the importance both of separating the primary and 
processed activities for the purpose of calculating agricultural assistance rates, and of 
being explicit about the extent of pass-through that is occurring in practice and hence its 
consequences for the   in both the primary agricultural and processing activities. NRAs
19  
  The above examples involving processors also can be generalized to any 
participants in the value chain. In particular, state trading enterprises and para-statal 
marketing boards may well intervene significantly, especially if they have been granted 
monopoly status by the government. Such domestic institutions may explain the 
econometrically estimated low degree of transmission of price changes at a border to 
farm-gate domestic prices – even after significant reform of more-explicit price and trade 
policies (see Baffes and Gardner 2003 and the references cited therein). Where reform 
also involved freeing up previously controlled parts of the marketing chain, the lowered 
                                                 
19 As with the incidence of the exchange rate distortion discussed above, from the viewpoint of wanting to 
use the   and   estimates later as parameters in a CGE model, the assumptions made here about 
the extent of pass-though along the value chain may not affect greatly the model’s results for real variables 
such as prices, output and value added.  
NRA CTE  20
marketing margin can provide a benchmark against which to compare the pre-reform 
margin (as in Uganda from the mid-1990s, see Matthews and Opolot 2007). 
 
The mean of agricultural NRAs 
We need to generate a weighted average  for covered products for each country, 
because only then can we add the for non-covered products to get the  for all 
agriculture. When it comes to averaging across countries, each polity is an observation of 
interest, so a simple average is meaningful for the purpose of political economy analysis. 
But if one wants a sense of how distorted is agriculture in a whole region, a weighted 
average is needed. The weighted average   for covered primary agriculture can be 
generated by multiplying each primary industry’s value share of production (valued at the 






20 The overall sectoral rate, which we denote , can be obtained by 
adding also the actual or assumed information for the non-covered commodities and, 
where it exists, the aggregate value of non-product-specific assistance to agriculture. 
NRAag
A weighted average can be similarly generated for the tradables part of agriculture – 
including those industries producing products such as milk and sugar that require only 
light processing before they can be traded – by assuming that its share of non-product-
specific assistance equals its weight in the total. Call that  .  
t NRAag
 
The dispersion of agricultural NRAs 
 
In addition to the mean, it is important to provide also a measure of the dispersion or 
variability of the NRA estimates across the covered products. The cost of government 
policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource misallocation tend to be greater the 
greater the degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 1974). In the case of agriculture 
which involves the use of farm land that is sector-specific but transferable among farm 
                                                 
20 Corden (1971) proposed that free-trade volume be used as weights, but since they are not observable (and 
an economy-wide model is needed to estimate them) the common practice is to compromise by using actual 
distorted volumes but undistorted unit values or, equivalently, distorted values divided by (1+ NRA). If 
estimates of own-and cross-price elasticities of demand and supply are available, a partial equilibrium 
estimate of the quantity at undistorted could be generated, but if those estimated elasticities are unreliable 
this may introduce more error than it seeks to correct.   21
activities, the greater the variation of   across industries within the sector then the 
higher will be the welfare cost of those market interventions. A simple indicator of 




Anderson and Neary (2006) show that it is possible to develop a single index that 
captures the extent to which the mean and standard deviation of protection together 
contribute to the welfare cost of distortionary policies. Once the NRAs and CTEs have 
been calculated by country authors, they will be used to generate such an index in a way 
that allows for the NRAs and CTEs to be due to domestic or border measures and to be 
positive or negative and unequal (Lloyd, Croser and Anderson 2008).   
 
Trade bias in agricultural assistance 
A trade bias index also is needed, to indicate the changing extent to which a country’s 
policy regime has an anti-trade bias within the agricultural sector. This is important 
because, as mentioned in the theory section above, the Lerner (1936) Symmetry Theorem 
demonstrates that a tariff assisting import-competing farm industries has the same effect 
on farmers’ incentives as if there was a tax on agricultural exports; and if both measures 
are in place, this is a double imposition on farm exports. The higher is the nominal rate of 
assistance to import-competing agricultural production ( ) relative to that for 
exportable farm activities ( ), the more incentive producers in that sub-sector will 
have bid for mobile resources that would otherwise have been employed in export 
agriculture, other things equal. 
m NRAag
x NRAag
  Once each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of 
exportables, or as producing a non-tradable (with its status sometimes changing over the 
years – see next section), it is possible to generate for each year the weighted average 
 for the two different groups of tradable farm industries. They can then be used to 
generate an agricultural trade bias index defined as: 
NRAs
                                                 
21 The mean and standard deviations could be captured by a single measure, namely, the trade 
restrictiveness index (TRI) developed by Anderson and Neary (2005). Calculating the TRI even in its 
simplest partial equilibrium mode requires knowing the own-and cross-price elasticities of demand and 
supply (or at least of elasticity of import demand, but that short cut is only usable if the NRA and CTE are 
















where   and   are the average   for the import-competing and 
exportable parts of the agricultural sector (their weighted average being  ). This 
index has a value of zero when the import-competing and export sub-sectors are equally 
assisted, and its lower bound approaches -1 in the most extreme case of an anti-trade 
policy bias. 
m NRAag x NRAag NRAs
t NRAag
Anderson and Neary (2006) show also that it is possible to develop a single index 
that captures the extent to which import protection reduces trade. Once the NRAs and 
CTEs have been calculated by country authors, they will be used to generate such an 
index in a way that allows for the trade effects to be due to domestic or border measures 
and to be positive or negative (Lloyd, Croser and Anderson 2008). 
 
Indirect agricultural assistance/taxation via non-agricultural distortions  
In addition to direct assistance to or taxation of farmers, the Lerner (1936) Symmetry 
Theorem further demonstrates that their incentives are also affected indirectly by 
government assistance to non-agricultural production in the national economy. The 
higher is the nominal rate of assistance to non-agricultural production ( ), the 
more incentive producers in other sectors will have bid up the value of mobile resources 
that would otherwise have been employed in agriculture, other things equal. If   is 
below  , one might expect there to be fewer resources in agriculture than there 
would be under free market conditions in the country, notwithstanding any positive direct 




NRAnonag NRAag < . A weighted average can 
be generated for the tradables part of non-agriculture too, call it  . 
t NRAnonag
One of the most important negative effects on farmers is protection from import 
competition for industrialists. Tariffs are part of that, but so too – especially in past 
decades – are non-tariff barriers to imports. Other primary sectors (fishing, forestry and 
minerals and energy raw material extraction) on average tend to be subject to less direct 
distortions than either agriculture or manufacturing, but there are important exceptions. 
One example is a ban on logging, but if such a ban is for genuine natural resource   23
conservation reasons it should be ignored. Another example is a resource rent tax on 
minerals. Unlike an export tax or quantitative restriction on exports of such raw materials 
(which are clearly distortive and would need to be included in the   for mining), a 
resource rent tax, like a land tax, can be fairly benign in terms of resource re-allocation 
(see Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1983) and so can be ignored. 
NRA
The largest part of most economies is the services sector. It produces mostly non-
tradables, many of them by the public sector. Distortions in services markets have proven 
to be extraordinarily difficult to measure, and no systematic estimates across countries are 
available even for a recent period, let alone over time. The only feasible way forward in 
generating time series estimates of   for this project is to assume all services 
are non-tradable and that they, along with other non-agricultural non-tradables, face no 
distortions. All the other non-agricultural products can be separated into exportables and 
import-competing products for estimating correctly their weighted average  , 
ideally using production valued at border prices as weights (although in practice most 
authors had to use GDP shares). 
NRAnonag
NRAs
As already mentioned in the previous section on agriculture, foreign exchange 
rate misalignment relative to what fundamentals would suggest is the value of a country’s 
currency will be ignored. This is because a real appreciation of the general foreign 
exchange rate lowers uniformly the price of all tradables relative to the price of 
nontradables, and conversely for a real devaluation. If a change in the exchange rate is 
caused by aid or foreign investment inflows, then the excess of tradables consumption 
over tradables production leads to a new equilibrium. Certainly such a new inflow of 
funds would reduce incentives for farmers producing tradable products, but this is not a 
welfare-reducing policy distortion. Thus, it is only the exchange rate distortions due to a 
dual or multiple exchange rate system that need to be included in the calculation of the 
 for the exportable and import-competing parts of the non-agricultural sector and 
hence of  , and in the same way as discussed above for their inclusion in the 





Assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural production   24
Given the calculation of   and   as above, it is then possible to 
calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance, 
t NRAag
t NRAnonag


















Since an   cannot be less than -1 if producers are to earn anything, neither can the  NRA
RRA . This measure is a useful indicator for providing international comparisons over 
time of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti- or pro-agricultural bias. 
 
How the theory is put into practice in this study 
 
Making the above theory operational in the real world, where data are often scarce 
especially over a long time period, is as much an art as a science.
22 Thankfully we did not 
have to start from scratch in many countries. Nominal rates of assistance are available 
from as early as 1955 in some cases, and at least from the mid-1960s, to the early or mid-
1980s for the 18 countries included in Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1992) and 
Anderson and Hayami (1986). Much has been done to provide detailed estimates since 
1986 of direct distortions to farmer (though not food processing) incentives in the high-
income countries that are now members of the OECD, and (since the early or mid-1990s) 
in selected European transition economies and Brazil, China and South Africa (OECD 
2006, 2007). As well, at least for direct distortions, the K/S/V measures have been 
updated to the mid-1990s for some Latin American countries (Valdes 1996) and provided 
also for some East European countries (Valdes 2000); and a new set of estimates of 
simplified PSEs for a few key farm products for China, India, Indonesia and Vietnam 
since 1985 are now available from IFPRI (Orden et al. 2007). Each of these studies uses 
variations on the above methodology, but the basic price data at least, as well as the 
narratives attached to those estimates, are invaluable springboards for the present study.
23  
                                                 
22 In addition to the methodologies of Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1991) and the OECD (2006) for 
estimating agricultural distortion and producer support indicators, see the recent review of methodologies 
of other previous studies by Josling and Valdes (2004).  
23 Also of great help are some other trade policy studies including importantly for trade and exchange rate 
distortions the various multi-country studies such as the one summarized in Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger 
(1978)) and the more-recent ones summarized in Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1989), Michaely, 
Papageorgiou and Choksi (1991), Bates and Krueger (1993), and Rodrik (2003).   25
 
Time period coverage 
For Europe’s transition economies it is difficult to get meaningful data prior to 1992. For 
the same reason estimates are not very meaningful before the 1980s for China and 
Vietnam. For all other countries, the target start date is 1955, especially if that includes 
some pre-independence years to see what difference independence made, although for 
numerous developing countries the data simply are not available. The target finish date is 
2004, but where available 2005 data are included. In most cases the most recent few years 
offer the highest quality data. 
 
Farm product coverage 
The agricultural commodity coverage includes all the major food items (rice, wheat, 
maize or other grains, soybean or other temperate oilseeds, palm or other tropical oils, 
sugar, beef, sheep/goat meat, pork, chicken and eggs, milk) plus other key country-
specific farm products (e.g., other staples, tea, coffee or other tree crop products, tobacco, 
cotton, wine, wool). Globally, as of 2001 (according to the GTAP database, see 
Dimaranan 2006), one-third of the value added in all agriculture and food industries is 
highly processed food, beverages and tobacco, which we will deal with in the same 
cursory way as for non-agricultural products. Fruit and vegetables are another one-sixth, 
so the rest constitute the other half. Of that other half, meats are one-third, grains and 
oilseeds are almost another one-third, dairy products are one-sixth, and sugar, cotton and 
other crops account for just over one-fifth. When the high-income countries are excluded, 
those shares change quite a bit: highly processed food, beverages and tobacco is only half 
as important, fruits and vegetables is somewhat more important and, when those two 
groups (which together account for 41 percent of the total) are excluded, the residual is 
equally divided between three groups: meats; grains and oilseeds; and other crops and 
dairy products. By focusing on all major grain, oilseed and livestock products plus any 
key horticultural and other crop products, the coverage reaches the target of 70 percent of 
most countries’ value added in agriculture and lightly processed food. Priority is given to 
the most-distorted industries, because then the residual will have not only a low weight 
but also a low degree of distortion.   26
On the household food expenditure side, if highly processed food, beverages and 
tobacco are excluded, then fruits and vegetables account for almost one-quarter of that 
spending in developing countries. When they are also excluded, three groups each 
account for almost 30 percent of expenditure: pig and poultry products, red meat and 
dairy products, and grains and oilseed products. All other crops account for the remaining 
one-eighth. So from the consumer tax viewpoint, the desired product coverage is the 
same as suggested above from a production viewpoint.  
Each product is explicitly identified as import-competing, exporting or non-
tradable. For many products that categorization changes over time, in some cases moving 
monotonically through those three categories and, in others, fluctuating in and out of non-
tradability. Hence an indication of a product’s net trade status is given each year rather 
than just one categorization for the whole time series. And for large-area countries with 
high internal and coastal shipping costs, some regions within that country may be 
exporting abroad even while other regions are net importers from other countries. In such 
cases it is necessary to estimate separate   for each region and then generate a 
national weighted average.  
NRAs
 
Farm input coverage 
The range of input subsidies considered in any particular country study will depend on 
the degree of distortions in that country’s input markets. In addition to fertilizer, the other 
large ones are likely to be electric or diesel power, pesticides and credit (including 
occasionally large-scale debt forgiveness, as in Brazil and Russia, although how that is 
spread beyond the year of forgiveness is problematic).
24 There are also distortions to 
water, but the task of measuring water subsidies is especially controversial and complex 
so they are not included in the   calculations (just as the OECD has ignored them in 
its PSE calculations). Similarly, distortions to land and labor markets are excluded, apart 




                                                 
24 For an analysis of input subsidies in Indian agriculture, see Gulati and Narayanan (2003).   27
For the international trading costs   and  , the fob-cif gap in key bilateral trades in the 
product in years when the product was traded in significant quantities is used. Both 
international and domestic trading costs are a function of the quality of hard infrastructure 
(roads, railways, ports) and soft infrastructure (business regulations, customs clearance 
procedures at state and national borders), each of which can be affected by government 
actions. But since it is difficult to allocate those costs between items that are avoidable 
and those that are unavoidable, measuring the aggregate size of the distortions involved 
in a comparable way for a range of countries is beyond the scope of this study.
m T x T
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Classifying farm products as import-competing, exportable or non-tradable 
The criteria to be used in classifying farm industries as import-competing (M), exportable 
(X) or non-tradable (H) are not straightforward. Apart from the complications raised 
above about whether a product is non-traded simply because of trade taxes or non-tariff 
barriers, there will be cases where trade is minimal, or the trade status has been reversed 
because of the policy distortions, or the industry is characterized by significant imports 
and exports. A judgment has to be made for each sector each year as to whether it should 
be classified as M, X or H. In the case of the two tradable classifications, that will 
determine which exchange rate distortion to use. If trade is minimal for trade cost rather 
than trade policy reasons, then it is classified as non-tradable if the share of production 
exported and the share of consumption imported are each less than 2.5 percent – except 
in cases (e.g. rice for China) where it is clearly an exportable year after year even though 
the self-sufficiency rate is rarely above 101 percent. Otherwise, where the share of 
production exported is substantially above (below) the share of consumption imported, 
that sector is classified as exportable (importable).  
  In cases where the trade status has been reversed because of the policy distortion 
(e.g. an export subsidy (in combination with a prohibitive import tariff) is sufficiently 
                                                 
25 That these costs vary hugely across countries, and often dwarf trade taxes, is now clearly established. 
See, e.g., World Bank (2006a,b) and also www.doingbusiness.org  and the governance and anti-corruption 
indicators at http://info.worldbank.org/governance. Also now available is a database on information and 
communications cost indicators for 144 countries, at www.worldbank.org/ic4d. In some settings trading 
cost-induced price bands due to missing or imperfect markets in rural areas cause poor farmers to forego 
cash crop production in order to ensure enough food production for survival (de Janvry, Fafchamps and 
Sadoulet 1991; Fafchamps 1992). This contributes to a low supply responsiveness of poor producers to 
international price changes for those cash crops.   28
large as to encourage production enough to generate an export surplus), that product 
should be given the classification of the trade status that would prevail without that 
intervention (i.e., import-competing). The same applies where tariff preferences reverse a 
country’s trade status for a product. Many countries enjoy preferential access for their 
exports into protected markets of other countries. In some cases these are bilateral or 
plurilateral free-trade agreements or customs unions. In other cases they are unilaterally 
offered by higher-income countries to developing countries under schemes such as the 
Generalized System of Preferences, the Cotonou Agreement (for former colonies of 
European Union member countries) and the EU’s Everything But Arms Agreement with 
Least Developed Countries. In the few extreme cases where these preferences are such 
that they (in combination with a prohibitive import tariff) cause the developing country to 
become an exporter of a product that would otherwise be import-competing (e.g. sugar in 
the Philippines), the product should nonetheless be classified as import-competing – since 
it is this developing country’s import-restrictive policy that is allowing its domestic price 
to equal that earned in exporting to the preference-providing country.  
Where there are significant exports and imports in a given year, closer scrutiny is 
required. If for example there are high credit or storage costs domestically, a product may 
be exported immediately following harvest but imported later in the year to satisfy 
consumers out of season. That would be considered an exportable for purposes of 
calculating the NRA, because even if there are policies restricting out-of-season imports 
(which would affect the CTE calculation) they would not be an encouragement to that 
year’s earlier production in the presence of high credit or storage costs. 
If trade/exchange rate distortions were sufficiently large as to choke off 
international trade in a product, then they contribute to the   and CTE only to the 
extent needed to drive that trade to zero: any trade taxes larger than that have an element 
of redundancy. Where there are trade policy distortions with no trade passing over them 
(that is, they are prohibitive), there may still be policy effects that need to be measured – 
but they will differ from those implied above. One example is where a prohibitive tariff, 
that is high enough to take the price of imported goods above the autarchy price, results 
in no imports. In that case the NRA would be less than that prohibitive tariff rate. 
Another common example is where there is an import tariff but the world price is high 
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enough that the country is freely exporting this product. In that case the domestic price 
would be determined by the world price less export trade costs and the import tariff 
would be irrelevant: there would be no distortion despite the presence of the import tariff 
measure.  
Similar conditions apply to exportable goods, where a prohibitive export tax may 
create a distortion equal to less than the tax rate. In this case the distortion wedge would 
be equal to the difference between the autarchy price and the world price less export trade 
costs; or, if the country were freely importing the good, the export tax would be irrelevant 
and there would be no distortion despite the presence of the export tax measure. The 
choice of international price to be compared with domestic prices therefore is not based 
just on the actual trading status of the country (Byerlee and Morris 1993). Moreover, 
different prices may be needed for different regions of a large country that simultaneously 
export and import because internal (including coastal shipping) trading costs are so high 
relative to international trading costs (Koester 1986). In that case the value of production 
is split according to those region’s production shares. If the only intervention in this 
sector is a tariff on imports, that tariff rate is the   estimate for the import-competing 
part and zero would be the   for the other part of that sector, and those different 
NRAs would be included in the weighted average calculations of the NRAs for the 




Transmission of assistance/taxation along the agricultural value chain 
A crucial aspect of the   calculation for agricultural products is how any policy 
measure beyond the farm gate gets transmitted back to farmers and forward to 
consumers. Various pictorial images of the value chain structure under various 
circumstances are shown in Figures 4 to 7 of Anderson, Martin, Sandri and Valenzuela 
(2006). Only a few parameters and exogenous variables are needed to obtain meaningful 
estimates of an individual agricultural product’s   and CTE.  
NRA
NRA
Specifically, to take account of pass-through of distortions along the value chain, 
the following parameters are identified (although the default is equi-proportionate pass-
through):   30
•  f θ , the extent to which any distortion to a primary farm product at the wholesale 
level is passed back to farmers; and 
•  θ , the extent to which any distortion to the downstream processed product is 
passed back to wholesalers of a primary farm product that is nontradable. 
 
Consumer tax equivalent of the farm product 
Many farm products are processed and often used as an ingredient in further 
manufacturing of a food product before purchased by the final consumer (e.g., wheat is 
ground to flour and then mixed with other ingredients before being baked and often sliced 
and packaged for sale as bread). Others are used as inputs into different farm activities, 
again often after some processing (e.g., soybeans are crushed and the meal is mixed with 
maize or other feedgrains for use as animal feed while the oil is sold for cooking). 
Because of these many and varied value chain paths, and because in practice it is difficult 
anyway to determine the extent to which a change in the primary farm product would be 
passed along any of those value chains, the OECD expresses its CSE simply at the level 
at which a product is first traded (e.g., as wheat or soybean or beef). That practice is 
adopted here too for generating a consistent set of estimates across countries of the CTE 
(even though authors of some individual country studies report CTEs that they may have 
estimated in a more-sophisticated way further along the value chain). The CTE at the 
point at which a product is first traded will be the same as the NRAo in the absence of any 
domestic production or consumption taxes or subsidies directly affecting that product 
(and recall that the NRAo in that case also equals the NRA if NRAi is zero).  
 
Key required information 
A template spreadsheet has been designed to aid the management of individual country 
information and ensure a consistent comparison across regions and periods. The precise 
ways in which parameters and exogenous variables entered each country spreadsheet to 
generate endogenously the  and CTEs are mostly straightforward, the main 
exception being the treatment of exchange rate distortions described below. 
NRAs
The key exogenous variables needed are agricultural quantities produced and 
consumed (or imported and exported if a proxy for consumption is to be production plus   31
net imports); wholesale and border prices of primary and lightly processed agricultural 
goods (and, where relevant, a quality adjustment to match border prices); agricultural 
input and output domestic subsidies and taxes (the default is zero); if there are distorted 
farm input markets, the input’s share in the value of farm output at border prices (and, if 
there are only farm-gate rather than wholesale prices for a primary good, the proportion 
of the farm-gate value in the value at the wholesale level at border price); final food 
consumer domestic subsidies or taxes (the default is zero); and the official exchange rate 
(and, where prevalent, the parallel exchange rate and the share of currency going through 
that secondary or illegal market, plus the product-specific exchange rate if a multiple 
exchange rate system is in place). 
 
Exchange rate distortions 
The treatment of exchange rate distortions is worth spelling out since it differs from the 
method used by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988, 1991).  
If there are no exchange rate distortions, the official exchange rate is used. 
However, in the presence of a parallel market rate (which could be the black market rate 
if no legal secondary market exists), this is reported along with an estimate of the 
proportion of foreign currency which is actually sold by exporters at the parallel market 
rate. This proportion would be the formal retention rate where a formal dual exchange 
regime is in place, or otherwise a guesstimate of the proportion traded on the black 
market (premia for which are provided by Easterly 2006 and International Currency 
Analysis 1993). The spreadsheet then computes an estimate for the equilibrium exchange 
rate for the economy, which is the rate at which international prices are converted into 
local currency to compute each  .   NRA
Relevant exchange rates for importers and exporters are also then computed 
endogenously. If they are distorted away from the official exchange rate, the relevant 
exchange rate for importers and exporters are respectively the discounted parallel market 
rate and the weighted average of the official exchange rate and the discounted parallel 
rate according to the proportion of the exporter’s currency that is sold on the parallel 
market. However, if a multiple exchange rate system is in place and that system provides 
for a specific rate for a product that differs from the general rates automatically calculated   32
as above, then the automatically computed relevant exchange rate is replaced by that 
industry-specific rate. 
 
‘Guesstimates’ of NRAs for the non-covered agricultural products  
In calculating the weighted average rates of assistance for a sub-sector or sector,   
have to be ’guesstimated’ for the non-covered (30 percent or so) agricultural products for 
which price comparisons are not calculated. The OECD in its PSE work assumes the not-
measured part has the same market price support as the average of the measured part. 
Another default is to assume the rates are zero. Orden et al. (2007) show that these two 
alternatives produce significantly different results for India, so it is preferable to make 
informed judgments for the import-competing, exporting and non-tradable parts of the 
residual group of farm products. An average applied import tariff is often the best guess 
for only the import-competing products in that set if there is no evidence of explicit 
production, consumption or export taxes or subsidies. Even though that will miss non-
tariff trade barriers affecting these residual products, the bias will be small if their weight 
is small.  
NRAs
 
Non-product-specific assistance to agriculture 
If there are non-product-specific forms of agricultural subsidies or taxes in addition to 
product-specific ones, that cannot even be allocated as between importables, exportables 
and non-tradables, these are included in the   in the same way (as a percentage of 
the total value of production) as done for these types of interventions in the calculation by 
the OECD (2007a).  
NRAag
No attempt is made to estimate the discouraging effects of under-investment in 
rural infrastructure and under-development of pertinent institutions. Also important is the 
structure of that expenditure within the rural sector. This may well be a non-trivial part of 
the distortions to agricultural incentives, but unfortunately it is not captured in the above 
measures of distortions.  
In some higher-income countries governments also assist farm households with 
payments that are purported to be ‘decoupled’ from production incentives. An example is 
the single farm payment in the European Union. We do not count them as part of NRAag   33
because the latter refers specifically to measures that alter producer incentives. However, 
we do include the ad valorem equivalent of those payments when discussing assistance to 
farmers as a social group, so as to be able to compare its order of magnitude with support 
from measures that alter production incentives. 
 
Assistance to non-agricultural sectors 
If the non-agricultural sectors are assisted only via import tariffs on manufactures or 
export taxes on minerals, it is a relatively easy task to estimate a weighted average 
 once the shares of import-competing, exporting and non-tradables 
production are determined. In practice, however, there are also non-tariff trade measures 
to consider among the measures affecting tradables (Dee and Ferrantino 2005, OECD 
2005); and most economies have myriad regulations affecting their many service 
industries. Those regulations can be very complex (see Findlay and Warren 2001). Since 
most of the outputs of service industries (including the public sector) are non-tradable, 
the default in this study is to assume their average rate of government assistance – along 
with that of non-tradable non-agricultural goods – is zero. Then the task of estimating 
the is reduced to obtaining just the   for producers of import-competing 
and for export-oriented nonagricultural goods, plus their shares of the undistorted value 
of production of non-agricultural tradables, in order to obtain the weighted average 
 for entering into the 
NRAnonag
NRAnonag NRAs
t NRAnonag RRA  calculation. 
 
Use of percentages in the chapters 
Just for simplifying the presentation in the country chapters, the NRAo , NRAi ,  , 
, and 
NRA
CTE RRA  are expressed there as percentages rather than proportions. 
 
Dollar values of farmer assistance and consumer taxation 
The country authors’ estimate of   are multiplied by the gross value of production at 
undistorted prices to obtain an estimate in current US dollars of the direct gross subsidy 
equivalent of assistance to farmers (GSE). This can then simply be added up across 
products for a country and across countries for any or all products to get regional and 
global aggregate transfer estimates for the studied countries. To get an aggregate estimate 
NRA  34
for the rest of a region, we assume the weighted average NRA for non-studied countries is 
the same as the weighted average NRA for the studied countries in that region, and that 
the non-studied countries’ share of the region’s gross value of farm production at 
undistorted prices each year is the same as its share of the region’s agricultural GDP 
measured at distorted prices. 
 Just  as  the  NRA (the percentage distortion to the gross price of farm products) is 
used to generate the gross subsidy equivalent of assistance to farmers, so the RRA (the 
percentage distortion to the relative price of farm products as a group) can be made use of 
to generate a net subsidy equivalent of aggregate assistance to farmers (NSE). The same 
scaling-up technique as for GSE is used to get a regional aggregate NSE estimate that 
includes non-studied countries. 
  To obtain comparable dollar value estimates of the consumer transfer, we have 
taken the CTE
 estimate at the point at which a product is first traded and multiplied it by 
the gross value of consumption at undistorted prices (proxied by production at 
undistorted prices plus net imports) to obtain an estimate in current US dollars of the tax 
equivalent to consumers of primary farm products (TEC). This too can then be added up 
across products for a country and across countries for any or all products to get regional 
and global aggregate transfer estimates for the studied countries. We do not attempt to get 
an aggregate estimate for non-covered products in the studied countries nor for each 
region’s non-studied countries. 
The GSE and TEC dollar values can be illustrated in a supply-demand diagram for 
a distorted domestic market for a farm product (see Figure 2). In the case of an import-
competing product subjected to an import tariff tm plus a production subsidy sf and a 
consumption tax cc, the GSE is the rectangle abcd and the TEC is the rectangle ahfg. The 
GSE estimate is an overstatement to the extent of triangle cdj and the TEC estimate is an 
understatement to the extent of triangle efg, where those triangles are smaller the more 
price-inelastic are the supply and demand curves S and D, respectively. In the case of an 
exportable product subjected to an export tax tx, the GSE is the negative of the rectangle 
kruv and the TEC is the negative of the rectangle nquv.   
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Source: Martin (1993). See also Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1981), Kiguel and 
O’Connell (1995, 1997), and Shatc and Tarr (2000).    44
 Figure 2: Distorted domestic markets for farm products 
  
(a) An import-competing product subjected to an import tariff tm plus a production 
subsidy sf and a consumption tax cc  
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